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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
CLINTON PERANK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
> Supreme Court No. 86 0243 
\ Priority 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
INTRODUCTION 
Respondent State of Utah, pursuant to an Order of this Court 
dated November 1 0 , 1987, submits this Brief in response to the 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Ute Indian Tribe, filed on July 21, 1988. 
On August 7, 1987, the State filed witjh this Court a motion 
suggesting the Court invite the Ute Tribe to give its views on 
the reservation boundary issue in this casq. Since a deter-
mination of the boundary issue could affect the Tribe and its 
members, it seemed proper for the Tribe to be allowed an oppor-
tunity to express its views on that matter. On October 7, 1987, 
this Court granted the State's motion and iinvited the Tribe to 
file an amicus curiae brief. 
1 
Rather than addressing the central isque in this case— 
whether the Uintah Valley Reservation boundaries have been dimin-
ished—the Tribe chose to ignore the boundary issue in its briefr 
and commented only on the secondary issue df whether or not 
Appellant Perank was an Indian. This is puzzling in light of the 
importance of the boundary issue to the Tribe and its members. 
In any event, for the reasons stated below„ the Tribe is incor-
rect in its analysis of Mr. Perankfs statug as an Indian. 
ARGUMENT 
1. In its brief, the Tribe characterizes the issue of 
whether or not Appellant was an Indian as the "threshold" issue 
in this case (Tribe's Brief at p. 1). Not iso. 18 U.S.C. Sec-
tions 1152 and 1153 preclude State criminal) jurisdiction over 
"Indians" who commit crimes within Indian Country. Thus, in 
order to divest the Utah Courts of jurisdiction, Appellant must 
show that the crime was committed in Indiar} Country and that he 
held the legal status of an Indian. Neither of those require-
ments is a "threshold" issue to the other. Appellant simply must 
carry his burden on both. Perankfs Indian status is really not a 
controverted issue on appeal because Perank seems to have carried 
his burden of proof on his Indian status (Which was unfortunately 
unrebutted in the record below). In our view, the primary con-
troverted issue in this case is whether or not the crime was 
2 
committed within "Indian Country"—an issuq the Tribe has chosen 
to ignore. 
2. In our primary brief we took the position that Appellant 
had the burden of establishing his legal status as an Indian for 
purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1152 and 1153. Perartk submitted some 
evidence supporting his claim to Indian status. The State 
presented no evidence to the contrary, and "[g]iven the state of 
the record it cannot be said that Perank's status as an Indian . 
. . was not established below" (see Respondent's Primary Brief 
at p. 49). 
In light of the Tribe's erroneous assertions, some histori-
cal elaboration on Perank's Indian status is appropriate. Both 
the record and case law would seem to establish Perank's status 
as an Indian. Even though Perank was not fcn enrolled tribal 
member at the time of the offense, he was entitled to be enrolled 
under the Ute Tribal Constitution (and, as will be shown below, 
has since been enrolled). 
As a factual matter, Mr. Perank submitted affidavits at his 
probation revocation hearing from his father and mother (R. 69-
72) which stated that Perank's father is a full-blooded Ute 
Indian and an enrolled member of the Ute T)ribe, and that Perank 
was born in Roosevelt while his family was residing on the 
reservation. The record also contains a copy of Perank's birth 
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certificate (R. 76), and those of other Perank family members 
(R. 73-75). 
Article II of the Ute Tribal Constitution—which was in 
effect at the time of the offense—provided that the membership 
of the Ute Indian Tribe included: 
All children born to any member of the Ute Indian Tribe 
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation who is a resident 
of the Reservation at the time of the [birth of said 
children.1 
Perank fits the mold. The affidavits and birth certificates in 
the record (R. 69-76) demonstrate that Perank was the son of an 
enrolled member of the Ute Tribe (his father) who was residing on 
the reservation at the time of Perankfs bitfth. Under the Tribe's 
Constitution Perank was deemed to be a tribal member from birth, 
but was not formally enrolled because of a misinterpretation of 
the Tribal Constitution by the Tribal Business Committee. 
Despite the above-quoted provision of the Ute Tribal Constitu-
tion, the Tribal Business Committee attempted to limit tribal 
enrollment to those persons possessing a quantum of at least 
5/8ths Ute blood. These policies were begmn in the mid-1950!s 
1
 A copy of Article II of the Tribal Constitution is at-
tached hereto as Appendix A. The Court cam take judicial notice 
of that document under Rule 201(b), Utah R^ iles of Evidence. It 
should be noted that after Perank was enrolled, this part of the 
Constitution was amended to include a 5/8t^ is blood quantum 
requirement. 
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after the so-called "Mixed-Bloods" were terminated as tribal 
members by an Act of Congress (25 U.S.C. Sections 677-677aa). 
In 1977, lawsuits were filed in Ute Tribal Court on behalf 
of various children of enrolled tribal members who had been 
denied enrollment by the Tribal Business Cqmmittee because they 
did not possess the 5/8ths quantum of Ute blood. The plaintiffs 
claimed they were entitled to tribal membership under the above-
quoted section of Article II of the Tribal Constitution regard-
less of blood quantum. In Chapoose, et aln/ v. Ute Indian Tribe, 
et al. , Tribal Court No. 133-77f the Tribal Court held that 
Article II of the Tribal Constitution did indeed control and 
define membership in the Tribe, and the Tribal Business Committee 
could not abrogate those provisions by a mpre restrictive or-
dinance. The Tribal Court further found the plaintiffs were 
entitled to tribal benefits retroactive to the date of their 
complaints (1977). That decision was appealed to the Tribal 
Appellate Court, which affirmed. Copies of those decisions are 
attached as Appendices B and C, respectively, for the Court's 
convenience. 
In response to the above-cited rulingfe of the Tribal Courts, 
the Business Committee enacted an ordinance allowing plaintiffs 
to be enrolled as tribal members, subject to the approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior, acting through the B.I.A. Reservation 
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Superintendent (see Chapoose v. Clark, infx\a). The Reservation 
Superintendent refused to approve the enrollment, relying on a 
1955 Opinion by the Solicitor of the Interior stating that in the 
1954 Termination Act (25 U.S.C. Sections 677-677aa) Congress had 
preempted the Tribe's authority to set membership requirements. 
Plaintiffs then sued the Secretary of the Interior in the 
United States District Court. In that action, Judge David K. 
Winder held for the plaintiffs and found th}e Secretary's denial 
of the enrollment "clearly wrong" on the grounds that despite the 
1954 Act, the Ute Indian Tribe retained full power to control its 
own membership and membership was to be defined by Article II of 
the Ute Tribal Constitution, Chapoose, et gtl., v. Clark, 607 
F.Supp. 1027, 1036-1037 (D.C. Utah, 1985).? 
Finally, in the fall of 1986, the Tribal Business Committee 
authorized enrollment of all persons in the same class as the 
plaintiffs, i.e.: "all children born to ahy member of the Ute 
Indian Tribe . . . who is a resident of th£ reservation at the 
time of the birth of said children." Perafck was in the group of 
persons so enrolled. 
The Ute Tribefs brief claims that in order to qualify as an 
2
 It seems clear that the Tribe and its courts have full 
authority to determine tribal membership (Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)). However, the same does not hold 
true for the determination of reservation boundaries (see discus-
sion in Respondent's Primary Brief at pp. $-8). 
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Indian a person must be recognized as such by the Indian com-
munity in which he or she lives. Assuming,j arguendo, that is 
true, in this case the Tribe's own Constitution has recognized 
Perank as a member of the Tribe since his birth and Ute Tribal 
Courts have so held. It was only the Tribatl Business Committee 
who refused to list Perank and others as tribal members until 
required to do so by its own Courts. 
Finally, the Tribe is not accurate wh^n it attempts to 
create the impression that Perank was allowed to enroll only 
during a "window of opportunity" in October of 1986. If, as the 
record seems to indicate, Mr. Perank was the son of an enrolled 
tribal member who was residing on the reservation at the time of 
the child's birth, the Tribal Constitution and decisions of the 
Tribal Courts state that enrollment was his birthright from his 
birth up to April 15, 1988, when the Tribe amended its Constitu-
tion to include the 5/8ths blood quantum requirement.3 
Based on the affidavits and birth certificates in the record 
and the subsequent enrollment of Mr. Perank as required by the 
Tribal Constitution, we can reach no other conclusion than we 
stated in our primary brief that "[g]iven the state of the record 
3
 This is further supported by the Tjribal Court's ruling 
that the plaintiffs in Chapoose, et al., v|, Ute Indian Tribe, et 
al., supra, were entitled to tribal royalties and other benefits 
retroactive to the filing of their Complaints in 1977. 
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it cannot be said that Perank's status as am Indian under 18 
U.S.C. Sections 1152 and 1153 was not establlished below" (Brief 
of Respondent at 49). 
CONCLUSION 
The Tribe has had an opportunity to cojmment on the crucial 
issue in this case but has chosen not to do so. While the Court 
should review the record and the law relating to Mr. Perank's 
Indian status, Respondent State of Utah cannot in good faith 
claim this is a controverted issue on appeal. The real issue is 
whether the crime was committed in "Indian Country". 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of August, 1988. 
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I. CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE LTE INDIAN TRIBE 
OF THE UINTAH AND OURAY REsiRVATION 
PREAMBLE 
We, the Ute Indians of the Uintah, Uncompahgre and Whiteriver Bands hereafter to be known as 
the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, in order to establish a more responsible 
tribal organization, promote the general welfare, encourage educational progress, conserve and 
develop our lands and resources, and secure to ourselves and <pur posterity the power to exercise 
certain rights of home rule, not inconsistent with the Federal , Mate and local laws, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintih and Ouray Reservation. 
Article I — Territory 
The Jurisdiction of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Unitah and 0|iray Reservation shall extend to the 
territory within the original confines of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as set forth by Executive 
Orders of October3, 1861 and January 5. 1882, and by the Acts o|f Congress approved May 27, 1902, 
and June 19, 1902, and to such other lands without such boundaries as may hereafter be added thereto 
under any law of the United States, except as otherwise provided by law. 
Article II — Membershipl 
Section 1. The membership of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall 
consist as follows: 
(a) All persons of Indian blood whose names appear on the offial census roll of the Ute Indian 
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as of July 1, 1935. 
(b) All children born to any member of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
who is a resident of the Reservation at the time of the birth of said children. 
Sec. 2. The Tribal Business Committee shall have the power to promulgate ordinances, subject to 
review by the Secretary of the Interior, covering future membership and the adoption of new 
members. 
(a) No property rights shall be acquired or lost through membership in this organization except as 
provided hereing. 
Article III — The Business Committee 
Section 1. Tne governing body of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall 
be a business committee, known as the Uintah and Ouray Tribal Business Committee. 
Sec. 2. The Tribal Business Committee shall consist of six members, two (2) members duly 
elected from each of the three (3) bands of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, 
known as the Uintah, Uncompahgre and Whiteriver Bands. 
Sec. 3. The members of the Tribal Business Committe shall Ibe elected for a term of four (4) years, 
except ar the first election, when one (1) member from each banB shall be elected for a term of two (2) 
years; thereafter, their successors shall be elected for a term of four (4) years. 
Sec. 4. Tne Tribal Business Committee, so organized, shall elect from within its own number (1) a 
chairman, (2) a vice-chairman; and from within or without, (3) a secretar)', and (4) a treasurer, and 
such other officials and committees as may be deemed necesjsary. 
Sec. 5. The first election of the Tribal Business Committee hereunder shall be called, held and 
supervised by the present Tribal Business Committee within sixty (60) days after the ratification and 
approval of this Constitution. 
The candidate from each band receiving the highest number of votes shall hold office for a term of 
four (4) years, and the candidate from each band receiving the next highest number of votes shall hold 
office for two (2) years; thereafter, even' two (2) years a Tribal Business Committeeman shall be 
elected from each band to represent such bands for a term of four (4) years. 
After the first election, elections for the Tribal Business CJommittee shall be called at least sixty 
(60) days prior to the expiration of the terms of office of ithe members of the Tribal Business 
Committee. 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE UTE TRIBAL COURT 
UINTAH AND OURAY RESERVATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
APPENDIX B 
HASKELL LEVI CHAPOOSE, as Guardian X 
Ad Litem for and on behalf of his minor X 
children, to-wit: Shaun Thomas X 
Chapoose, JaNae Lyn Chapoose, Dixon X 
Levi Chapoose, Michell Quetta Chapoose, X 
and Connor Charles Chapoose, X 
X 
Plaintiffs, X 
1 
vs. X JUDGEMENT 
X 
UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH AND X 
OURAY RESERVATION, UINTAH AND OURAY XCivil No. 133-77 
TRIBAL BUSINESS COMMITTEE, RUBY BLACK, X 
CHARLES REDFOOT, ANTONE APPAWOO, MYRON X 
ACCUTTOROOP, OURAY McCOOK, FLOYD X 
WOPSOCK, as members of the Uintah and X 
Ouray Tribal Business Committee, and X 
CECIL ANDRUS, Secretary of the Interior X 
of the United Statesof America, $ 
X 
Defendants. X 
This matter comes on for hear|ing upon the Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgement. The Courit, having been advised of 
the facts, which are undisputed in this matter, will dispose 
of all issues in this judgement. 
The Ute Tribal Court of the Uintah and Ouray Reservatic 
is the proper forum to hear cases affecting membership in rhe 
Tribe. See, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Julia Martinez, et al.* Sup. Ct. 
76-682 published in 46 L.W. 4412 (1978J , and also Pritchett, et al. 
v. Ute Indian Tribe, et al., Civil Action NO. 52-77. 
The Court in Civil No. 92-77 has disposed of the 
question as to "What are the qualifications of a person to become 
a member of the Ute Indian Tribe of thfe Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation?" 
APPENDIX B 
The facts in this case are as follows: 
That the plaintiff, Haskell Levi Chapoosef is the father 
of the following children: 
1. Shaun Thomas Chapoose, born on April 23, 1967; 
2. JaNae Lyn Chapoose, born on March 15, 1969; 
3. Dixon Levi Chapoose, born on| February 24, 1971; 
4. Michelle Quetta Chapoose, botn on April 30, 1973; 
5. Connor Charles Chapoose, born on November 13, 197 6. 
That Haskell Levi Chapoose was blorn on August 30, 194 0 
at Fort Duchesne, Utah and he was listed ais member No. 199 in the 
list of full-blood in the Federal Registeri on April 5, 1956; he 
having been born to Connor Chapoose and Li^ lu Wass, both of whom 
were full-bloods; that he married Sherrie IL. Dixon on Sept. 3, 1966, 
and since that time they have been and now are husband and wife; 
that he and his wife resided upon the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
at the time each of his children above named were born. 
That thereafter, the plaintiff, Haskell Levi Chapoose, 
made application to the Tribal Business Committee of the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation requesting that each of said children be 
admitted to membership, and said applications were denied on 
June 2, 1977. 
The Constitution and By-laws of the Ute Indian Tribe 
provide: 
"Article II — MEMBERSHIP: 
Section 1. The membership of the Ute Indian Tribe 
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall consist 
as follows: 
(a) All persons of Indian blood whose names appear 
on the official census roll of the Ute Indian Tribe 
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as of July 1, 
1935. 
(b) All children born to any member of the Ute Indian 
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation who is a 
resident of the Reservation at |the time of the birth 
of said children. 
Section 2. The Tribal Business Committee shall have 
the power to promulgate ordinances, subject to review 
by the Secretary of the Interior, covering future 
membership and the adoption of new members. 
(a) No property rights shall be acquired or lost 
through membership in this org4nization except as 
provided herein." 
The Constitution and By-laws also provide in Article 
VI — POWERS OF THE TRIBAL BUSINESS COMMITTEE, as follows: 
"Section 1. Enumerated Powers. — The Tribal Business 
Committee of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall 
exercise the following powers, subjecbt to any limi-
tations imposed by the statutes or the Constitution 
of the United States, and subject fujrther to all ex-
press restrictions upon such powers contained in this 
Constitution and By-laws, and subject: to review by the 
Ute Bands themselves at any annual or special meeting: 
(j) To enact resolutions or ordinances, not inconsis-
tent with Article II of this Constitution governing 
adoption and abandonment of members, and to keep at 
all times a correct roll of the members of the Ute 
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation." 
And Article X — AMENDMENTS, st|ates as follows: 
"Amendments to the Constitution and JBy-laws may be 
ratified and approved in the same manner as this Con-
stitution and By-laws. Whenever the Tribal Business 
Committee shall, by an affirmative vote of four or 
more members, call for the submission of an amendment, 
the Secretary of the Interior shall call an election 
upon the proposed amendment. If at such election the 
amendment is adopted by a majority df the qualified 
voters of the Tribe voting thereon and if at least 
thirty (3 0) per cent of those entitled to vote shall 
vote in such election, such amendment shall be sub-
mitted to the Secretary of the Interior and if approved 
by him, shall thereupon take effect!" 
Pursuant to Article II, Section 2, in 1958 the Tribal 
Business Committee passed Ordinance No. p-58-1 dated September 17 
1958, as follows: 
."WHEREAS, much confusion has resulted on enrollment appli-
cations received on behalf of children born to parents, 
one of which is Ute Indian and the other either non-
Indian or an Indian of another Tribe; and, 
WHEREAS, the applications are becoming more frequent 
and the spirit of Public Law 671 (68 Stat. 8 68) is not 
being carried out by enrollment of phildren of 1/2 
degree Ute Indian blood; and 
WHEREAS, it is the desire of Ute Iridians to further restrict 
enrollment with the Ute Indian Tribje to prevent 
reoccurence of a condirion of many Jmixed-bloods on the rolls 
as was the case before the enactment of Public Law 671; 
and, 
WHEREAS, it is deemed to the best in 
Indian Tribe to so restrict further 
terest of the Ute 
enrollment; and, 
WdEKEPS, under Article II, Section 2.of the Constitution 
of the Ute Indian Tribe, the Tribal Business 
Committee is empowered to promuxyaue UIUJ.U 
I ances subject to review by the Secretary of | the Interior covering future membership and 
I the adoption of new members, 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT ENACTED BY THE UINTAH AND 
OURAY TRIBAL BUSINESS COMMITTEE that hereafter 
no person born subsequent to the adoption of 
this Ordinance shall be enrolled in the Ute 
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reser-
vation unless the degree of Ute Indian blood 
of such person is five-eighth (5/8) or more. 
Ute Indian blood as construed in this ordin-
ance shall mean Ute Indian blood of the Ute 
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and OUray Reser-
vation, Utah." 
And the Tribal Business Committee on July 26, 1950 
passed the following Ordinance which read^ in part: 
i "Defining 'Indian blood1 for thq purposes of 
future membership. Be it enacted subject to 
review of the Secretary of the Interior that 
hereafter for purposes of determining member-
ship in the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation all Indian blood pos-
sessed by persons whose names appear on the 
census roll of July 1, 1935 shall be deemed 
I to be Ute Indian blood." 
I Counsel for the plaintiff bring$ this action pursuant to 
I the provisions of Public Law 90-284 passed April 11, 1968 commonly 
I knows as the ICRA. 
THE COURT FINDS that Section 1(b) of Article II of the 
| Constitution and By-laws of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and 
I Ouray Reservation applies in this case sihce one parent was a mem-
»• jl ber of the Tribe at the time of the birth of said children they 
i 
IJ j, are therefore entitled to be enrolled to membership in the Ute 
jl 
I Indian Tribe. 
I 
ii The Court notes that Section 1(b) of Article II provides 
!| 
j. for birth of children to any member (in the singular) , and if said 
ji 
jj parent resides on the reservation at rhe time of the birth of the 
i 
I*
 > 
I child, only one parent need be a member 6f the Tribe. No amend-
jjments have been made to the Constitution and By-laws as provided 
jby Article X. 
The Constitution is the primary law of the reservation 
and in any situation where the same conflicts with an ordinance, 
the ordinance shall yield and the Constitution shall take preced-
ence. This does not mean that said Ordinance No. 0-58-1, at the 
idate of the commencement of this action, was null and void in all 
situations, but only as to those parts which conflict with the 
^Constitution itself. If the Tribal Business Committee desires to 
amend, there is provision for the amendment to be followed by the 
Business Committee in Article X above mentioned. 
Counsel for the defendants has urged consideration of 
Amended Enrollment Ordinance No. 78-8 of March 13, 1978 and Ordin-
ance No. 78-9 (which made some minor amendments to^Ordinance No. 
78-9) as superseding Ordinance No. 0-58-1 of September 17, 1958. 
This can not nullify the cause of action which accrued on June 2, 
1977. 
There are many points of law raised by counsel concernin 
the issues in this case which this Court feels are not persuasive 
and are irrelevant. Therefore the Court! will not respond thereto. 
I 
THE COURT THEREFORE FINDS that the following children of 
Haskell Levi Chapoose should be enrolled as members in good stand-
ing of the Ute Indian Tribe as of June 2, 1977: 
SHAUN THOMAS CHAPOOSE, born ori April 23, 1967; 
JANAE LYN CHAPOOSE, born on Mcjrch 15, 19 69; 
DIXON LEVI CHAPOOSE, born on February 24, 1971; 
MICHELLE QUETTA CHAPOOSE, born on April 30, 1973; 
CONNOR CHARLES CHAPOOSE, born on November 13, 197 6. 
IT IS .THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Tribal Business Committee is hereby enjoined to deny membership ir 
the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Quray Reservation to the 
above named children of Haskell Levi Chkpoose, and 
-5-
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants forthwith 
cause the plaintiff's childrens names to b^ added to the census 
rolls of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Umtald and Ouray Reservation 
and cause the Finance Officer of the Ute Indian Tribe to pay to 
Haskell Levi Chapoose, as the natural guardian of said children, 
all dividends or other benefits related to| Tribal Membership 
together with interest at the rate of six |per cent per annum from 
the date said payments should have been maide to this date covering 
all payments due after June 2, 1977. 
Court costs are assessed against the Tribal Business 
Committee. 
DATED this .^^ day of October, 197 9, 
BY THE COURT: 
<rr~<TRI$AL JUDGE 
CERTIFICATION 
f CERJTfFY THAT THIS DOCUMENT fS A 
TFU/E /^ND CORR^O? C O ^ T ^ F THE ORIGINAL 
~" COURT CLERK j/ ^ 
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Justice V.'yasket delivered the Opinion of the Court in which he is joined by 
Justice Dupuis. 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
Wyasket, J. These cases involve attempts by enrolled members of the Tribe to 
secure the enrollment.of their children. Each of the Plaintiffs below had 
applied to the Tribal Business Committee on behalf lof their minor children for 
the enrollment of those children. The Tribal Business Committee denied each 
of the applications on the grounds that the children did not meet the 5/8 Ute 
blood quantum requirement in the enrollment ordinance in force at the time of 
the application. 
CIV No. 133-77 
CIV No. 9-78 
CIV No. 11-78 
CIV No. 10-78 
CIV No. 12-78 
APPENDIX C 
Follov/ing the denial of the enrollment applications, Plaintiffs filed 
individual actions in the lite Tribal Court in the nature of Mandamus requesting 
an order requiring the enrollment of their children. Named as defendants in those 
actions were the Ute Tribe of the Uintah and OuraylReservation, the Uintah and 
Ouray Tribal Business Committee in their personal and official capacities, and 
the Secretary of the Interior as a representative of the United States. In a 
letter to the Tribal Court dated June 2, 1978, theiUnited States Department of 
Justice protested the naming of the Secretary of the Interior as a party defendant 
The Tribal defendants moved the trial court to dismiss. 
The Tribal Court, the Honorable George Armstrong presiding, granted the 
motion to dismiss defendants Ute Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, and 
the members of the Tribal Business Committee in their individual capacities on 
October 4, 1978. The motion to dismiss v/as denied as to the Uintah and Ouray 
Tribal Business Committee and the individual members thereof in their official 
capacities. No formal motion having been filed urging dismissal of the Secretary 
of the Interior, the Secretary was not dismissed, fend the Secretary has not 
appealed. 
While this Court recognized the principle of international law that one 
Nation does not generally have jurisdiction in its| courts over another Nation 
without its consent, this Court is not accustomed to trying cases by letter. 
Simple, straightforward, and commonly recognized procedures are available to 
any party defendant who believes they have been improperly brought before the 
Courts of the Ute Tribe. The Ute Tribe has always! complied with the procedural 
rules of the courts of the United States and the sjeveral States in raising 
such issues, and this Court knows of no reason that extending such a courtesy 
to the Ute Tribe would cause an undue hardship to a great nation like the 
United States. 
the reservation at the time of the birth of their children, and the cases were 
submitted on defendant's motions for summary judgment on the stipulated facts. 
The Tribal Court, on October 30, 1979, granted judgment to Plaintiffs in Civil 
Numbers 133-77 (Haskell Levi CHAP00SE), 9-78 (GARCIA), and 11-78 (REED0, and 
dismissed the actions in Civil Numbers 10-78 (E. Maxie CHAP00SE), and 12-78 
(W0PS0CK) on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run as to those 
claims. The Tribal Business Committee brought thH timely appeal from the 
judgment in Civil Numbers 133-77, 9-78, and 11-78. On December 13, 1979, 
Plaintiffs in Civil Numbers 10-78 and 12-78 filed notices of appeal, and 
Respondents in Civil Numbers 133-77, 9-78 and 11-78 filed cross appeals. The 
Tribal Business Committee has moved to dismiss the appeals and cross appeals by 
all Plaintiffs below. At oral argument on March 6, 1980, Civil Numbers 133-77, 
9-78 and 11-78 were joined for appeal, and the Court hereby consolidates and 
joins Civil "Numbers 10-78 and 12-78 with these cases for decision herein^ For 
the sake of clarity, the parties will be referred to by their designations in 
the Tribal Court. 
I. 
The inixial determination to be made by this Court is whether the appeals 
in Civil Numbers 10-78 and 12-78, and the cross appeals in Civil Numbers 133-77, 
9-78 and 11-78 can stand in the face of the defendant's motions to dismiss. 
Defendant aroues that the twenty day time limit prescribed in Rule 37(c) of the 
Ute Indian Rules of Civil Procedure for the filing of the notice of appeal is 
jurisdictional and dispositive of the appeals and cross appeals'filed by Plainti 
In pertinent part, Rule 37(c) U.I.R.C.P. states: 
C) Time; Notice of Appeal. Within 20 days from the entry of 
tne order of (sic) judgment appealed from the party taking the 
appeal must file with the trial court a written notice of appeal 
specifying the parties to the appeal, the order or judgment appealed 
from. ar*G a short statement of the reason or grounds for the appeal 
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including subsection (c) none of which are jurisdictional by the i r terms. 
Compliance with some subsections is clearly within the exclusive province 
of appellants while other provisions depend upon th$ diligence of court 
personnel and respondents for compliance. Because holding compliance in toto 
with Rule 37 jur i sd ic t ional would submit an aggrieved par t ies 1 appeal to 
possible failure due to causes outside his control, v/e are loath to do so. 
However, the orderly administration of justice requires that a t some 
point final orders and judgments of the Tribal Court must no longer be subject 
to appeal. In other words, t he r e must be a definative occurrence upon which a 
judgment not void ab in i t i o must be considered res judicata as against any attack 
In the absence of a defini te occurrence easi ly ascertainable by any person, the 
par t ies , public, and governmental off ic ia ls could never be sure when-a final order 
or judgment of the Tribal Court could be relied upon. 
I t is also c lear from the language of the statute that the l eg i s l a t ive 
intent is to l imit appeals to cases wherein a noticfe of appeal is f i led within 
the prescribed time l imi t . We, therefore, hold that the time l imita t ion of 20 
days for fil ing an original notice of intent to appeal found in U.I.R.C.P. Rule 
37(c) is jur isdict ional and accordingly, the appeals in Civil Numbers 10-78 and 
12-73 must be and are hereby dismissed. 
However, once the order or judgment has come udder attack by appeal, simple 
fairness indicates that the respondent be given an opportunity to ra ise those 
portions of that order or judgment by which he deemls himself aggrieved. This 
Court recognizes t ha t in many cases a party may be laggrieved by a portion of an 
order or judgment of the Tribal Court but may not wish to undertake the costly 
and time consuming process of an appeal. "Once a judgment has been brought under 
attack and the respondent brought before t h i s Court, the Court in the absence 
of a clear l eg i s la t ive expression to the contrary views a cross appeal as being 
in the nature of.a counterclaim. 
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Rule 37(b) U.I.R.C.P. clearly indicates mat a nc^unuu-w 
aggrieved by a portion of any final order, commitment, or judgment of the 
trial court has a right to appeal. However, Rule 37 does not clearly indicate 
the procedures to be followed on such a cross appeal i. In the absence of 
legislative direction by the Tribal Business Committee as to the proper pro-
cedures for cross appeals, we today announce the following rules for taking 
cross appeals by respondents. Within twenty days off the filing of appellants 
notice of appeal, which time period shall be jurisdictional, respondent may 
file a notice of cross appeal with the trial court in the same manner as notices 
of appeal are filed. Respondent shall brief all issued raised in his cross 
appeal in his reply brief. Appellant shall then have 20 days after receipt of 
respondent's brief, memorandum or statement in which to reply, to the new issues 
raised by the cross appeal. Cross appeals shall otherwise proceed as provided 
in Rule 37 U.I.R.C.P. In the interest of justice the time limitation on filing 
cross, appeals announced herein shall have prospective application only, and 
Plaintiffs cross appeals in Civil Numbers 133-77, 9-78 and 11-78 will be 
considered by this Court. Defendants motion to di$miss these cross appeals is 
accordingly denied. 
II. 
Defendants first assignment of error is that the Tribal Business Committee 
and its members while acting in their official capacity are immune from suit 
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and that the court below erred in 
failing to dismiss. In support of this proposition, Defendants cite, inter alia, 
U.L.O.C. I 1-2-7, § 1-8-5 and the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S: 49 (1978ft. Plaintiffs reply that mandar 
is always an appropriate remedy for illegal actions of governmental officials evi 
5 
25 U.S.C. 1301 et. seq.f constitutes an implied waiver of sovereign .immunity 
in the tribal courts, and also cite the Santa Clara Pueblo decision in support 
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of their position. 
The question of jurisdiction whether raised in a state or federal court or 
this Court is frequently a delicate matter to deal with, and is especially so 
when the material and most important objection to the jurisdiction of this Court 
involves the basic nature of tribal government and the interrelationship of its 
parts to one another. It is, however, a question which we are called upon, and 
which it is our duty to decide^ In the words of the famous jurist Justice John 
Marshall in Cohen v. Virginia 6 Wheat. 264, 404, 5 .LEd. 257, 291: 
It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should 
not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction if it should. 
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because.it 
approaches the confines of the Constitution. W£ cannot pass it by 
because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, 
a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. 
We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is 
given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would 
be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly 
avoid, but we cannot avoid them. .All we can do is to exercise our best 
judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty. 
The decision in Santa Clara Pueblo, supra, stinds for the proposition 
that an Indian'tribe, as a tribe, is immune from suit in the federal courts 
absent an explicit and unequivocal waiver of that irtmunity by Congress, and 
that no such waiver is to be implied. See, Santa Clara Pueblo, supra at 58-59. 
We agree. Furthermore, the Court held that, as an individual officer of the 
Pueblo, Governor Lucario Padilla was not protected by the tribe's'immunity 
from suit. Santa Clara Pueblo, supra at 59. The issue in Santa Clara Pueblo then 
became whether the Indian Civil Rights Act created an implied cause of action 
against an individual in the federal courts, and the" court held that it did not. 
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that the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is inherently 
entitled to sovereign immunity. Accord, Santa Clara Pueblo, supra. However, 
the issue to be decided herein is not whether the Tribe is immune from suit, 
but whether the Tribal Business Committee and its members in their official 
capacities are immune from suit in a mandamus action to enforce an alleged 
constitutional right. 
The Constitution of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
is the organic and fundamental law of this Tribe which lays the basic principles 
to which its internal life is to be conformed, organizing the government, conferr-
ing authority upon certain branches of that government limiting the exercise of 
Governmental powers, and guaranteeing certain individual rights. Within that 
Constitution, the enumerated powers of the Tribal Business Committee encompass, 
inter alia, the legislative, executive, administrative, ministerial, and economic 
"functions of the tribe. 
Pursuant to Article VI, Section 1 (K) of the Constitution, this Court has 
been conferred general jurisdiction over all civil causes of action by U.L.O.C. 
Section 1-2-5 which provides in pertinent part: 
Subject to any contrary provisions, exceptions, or limitations contained 
in either federal law, or the Tribal Constitution, the Courts of the Ute 
Tribe shall have jurisdiction over all civil causes of action . . . 
In addition to this grant of general jurisdiction, the authority of the Ute Courl 
to issue extraordinary writs is recognized by statute. A Writ of Mandamus is su' 
an extraordinary writ, and its issuance is authorized by U.I.R.C.P. Rule 35 (a) 
which states: 
a) Grounds for Relief. Where no other plain, speedy, and adequate 
remedy exists, relief may be obtained by obtaining an extraordinary 
writ which may be granted for any one of thfe 'following grounds: 
1) • . . . 
2) . . . . 
3) Where the r e l i e f sought is to compel any inferior t r i b u n a l , 
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enjoins as a duty resulting from an office^ trust, or station; 
or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment 
of a right or office to which he 1s entitled and from which he 
is unlawfully excluded by such inferior tribunal, board, or 
person; or 
4) . . . . 
While U.L.O.C- 5 1-2-7 provides that whatever immunity the tribe, its officers, 
or employees may have is not waived by the general grant of jurisdiction contained 
therein, its application here begs the question. The question is whether, and to 
what extent the defendants are immune from suit und^r the Constitution and Code 
of the Tribe of tne common law. Turning first to the Tribal code, v/e find that 
the only provision of the Ute Constitution or Law and Order Code specifically 
establishes the defense of sovereign .immunity which has been brought to the 
attention of this Court is found at U.L.O.C. § 1-8-5. This section states that, 
"The Ute Tribe shall be immune from suit in any civfil action1', and tribal officers 
shall be immune from l:any liability arising from thp performance of their official 
duties." Apparently, there are as many definitions of "liability" as there are 
cases wherein courts have seen fit to define the term. See, Blacks Law Dictionary 
at 1059 (Revised Fourth Edition 1968) (West Publishing Co.) and cases cited 
therein. However, the distinction drawn between the immunity from "any civil 
action" and "any liability" in this statute persuades this Court that the immunity 
granted to tribal officers and employees is not intended to be immunity from any 
civil action, but is intended to provide immunity from personal liability in the 
sense of payment of damages or property from personal assets for alleged injuries 
arising from the performance of the official duties of those officers and employe* 
This Court can find no authority, and counsel1 have directed it to none, 
which specifically grants the Tribal Business Committee an exception in the form 
of a sovereign immunity defense, such as granted the tribe in U.L.O.C. § 1-2-5. 
8 
ne general rule ^s that a». express excepnuu LU um WU..V.. .__ 
authority precludes the establishment of other and different exceptions by 
implication. See» Massachusetts Trustees of East., G. and F. Assoc, v. United 
States, 312 F. 2d.-214, 222 {1st Cir. 1963): "We believe that;limitations 
upon an otherwise general grant of power should ncj>t lightly be inferred." In 
the words of the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States 
v, Jones, 567 F. 2d. 965, 967 (10th Cir. 1977): 
As a genera^ principle of statutory construction, if a statute 
specifies o n e exception to the general application, other exceptions 
are exclude^1 expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 
Vie are, however, reluctant to adopt so wide a rule, and, for public policy 
reasons, in this c a s e decline to do so. From thei foregoing discussion, it is 
sufficient to stflte that the Constitution and statutes of the Ute Tribe nowher? 
specifically provide immunity for these defendants in the instant case. We ar£> 
therefore, compel^ to consider whether the common law doctrine of sovereign 
immunity applies 5 0 a s to b a r thl's action. 
Defendants <pte Duoan'v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620, 10 L.Ed. 2d. 15, 23 (190: 
for the propositi00 that: 
The aeneral ru^e 1S that "a suit is against the sovereign if "the 
judcment soU9^ would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, 
or interfere w"*th t h e public administration,," or if the effect of the 
judament wou^ be "to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel 
it to act". (citations omitted). 
While this p r o p e l ^ o n 1S attractive at face vallue,*the United States Supreme 
Court in Duoan al s o recognized two distinct exceptions to that rule:-"(l) actic 
by officers beyond their statutory (constitutional) powers, and (2) even thougi 
within the scope °f their authority, the powers themselves or the manner in wh 
they are exercise^ a r e constitutionally void.ff Duoan, supra, at 621; Mai one v 
Bowdoin, 359 U.S. 6 ^ 3 , 547 (1962). In attempting to analytically rationalize 
(1 Cranch) 137; Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 
(1949); and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 426 U.S. 49 (1978) with this rule 
and its exceptions, it becomes readily apparent thatone is caught in an 
analytical treadmill. 
In Harbury v. Madison, supra, William Marbury had been appointed as a 
Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia during the waning portion of 
John Adams1 term as President of the United States. Pursuant to the statute 
then in effect, the signed commission was forwarded from the President to the 
Secretary of State!s office to be sealed and recorded. Mr. Lincoln, then 
Secretary of State, and James Madison who succeeded him, refused to deliver 
the cornmission or a copy thereof to Marbury, and Marbury brought an action 
asking the Court to order the Secretary of State to deliver the commission or 
a copy thereof to him as evidence of his appointment as a Justice of the Peace. 
In its embryonic form, the issue of sovereign immunity of an agent of the United 
States v/as raised by Mr. Lincoln when he objected that he was not bound by the 
Court, and ought not to answer as to any facts which came officially to his 
knowledge as Secretary of State. Marbury, supra at 143. Furthermore, the 
Secretary of" State objected that the court had no authority to compel him to 
deliver the commission. 
The Court in Marbury first considered whether the Plaintiff had a"legal 
right to the cornmission, and determined that withholding the commission was not 
warranted by law, and violated a vested legal right of the Plaintiff. Marbury, 
supra at 152. The Court then reached the issue of whether he had a remedy for 
the breach of his vested legal right by an officer of the United States. In 
finding that it was not the office of the person sued but the nature of the act 
which determined whether the action could be maintained, the Court stated at If 
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departments are the political or confidential agdnts of the execu-
tive, merely to execute the will of the President!, or rather to act 
in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal 
discretion, nothing can be more.perfectly clear 1^ han that their acts 
are only .-politically examinable. But where a specific duty is 
assigned by law, and individual rights depend upcpn the performance 
of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers 
himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for 
a remedy. 
A cursory examination of Justice Marshall's ruling in light of the rule 
announced in Dugan, supra, would seem to indicate that the action should have 
been barred. Clearly, a mandamus issued to an official of the government 
compelling an action within his authority would be to "compel (the Government) 
to act". 
In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp,, 337 U.S. 682 (1949), 
plaintiff alleged a breach of a contract of sale by the Administrator of the 
War Assets Administration, a legislatively created gqvemment agency. Plaintiff 
prayed for an injunction to prevent the Administrator! from delivering the coal, 
which was the subject of the contract, to a third party, and for a declaration 
thai the coal actually belonged to the plaintiff und^r the contract. In sub-
stance then, plaintiff's case was very similar to that of William Marbury in 
that in both cases, plaintiff sought an extraordinary writ to cure an alleged 
legal wrong. In Larson, however, .the court refused to consider whether the 
contract had, in fact, been violated and ruled that the Administrator was immune 
from suit under the theory that the requested relief would "restrain the govern-
ment" from acting by ordering the Administrator not to sell or deliver the coal 
involved to anyone other than the plaintiff. Larson^ supra, at 688, 689. 
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 1(1978), plaintiff brought 
an action for injunctive relief against the Santa Cliara Pueblo and its Governor, 
Lucario Padilla, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a tribal ordinance which 
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words, plaintiff claimed an alleged legal wrong, and sought injunctive relief 
to restrain the government, in the form of the Governor, from continuing its 
•alleged wrongdoing. In Santa Clara Pueblo, supra, the Court summarily stated 
that Governor Padilla was not immune from suit. 
In all these cases there lies a common thread. Plaintiff alleges a legal 
wrong to him by a government official, plaintiff brings an action for extra-
ordinary relief to cure the wrong, and in all these cases, the official, if the 
requested relief is to be entered, must be ordered to do that which he was 
refusing to do, or to not do that which he was doing. If the rule of Duoan v. 
Rank, supra, is dispositive of such cases, it is clea^ r that the defendant must 
be held iinmune in each case. However, in the Marburvj and Santa Clara Pueblo 
decisions, the government official was held not to be immune. 
The difficulty here lies in determining when and how the activities of a 
person occupying an official position in the government acts in such a manner 
that his actions are not personal actions, but are, *in fact, the actions of the 
sovereign. For the sovereign can act only through its agents, Larson, supra, at 
635, and when an agent acts for the sovereign, the spit is barred, not because 
it is against an officer of the government, but because it complains of an act 
of the sovereign. JcL 
In this situation, the exceptions posed in Dugafi become effectively a 
restatement of the rule. In other words, the only way to determine whether the 
rule applies, is to first determine that the exceptilons do not apply. A better 
method of analyzing the instant case would be, then, to first determine whether 
the action by the defendants is within their statutorily or constitutionally 
delegated authority, and, second, if the power to aot has been constitutionally 
delegated to that officer, whether the power was exercised in a constitutional 
manner. If so, the act of the officer, the sovereign's agent, is an act of 
12 
those actions. 
Applying this test to the situations found *in Hftrbury, Larson,- and Santa_ 
Clara, it is clear that the results of each case may| be rationally explained. 
In Marbury, the act complained of consisted of the Secretary of State denying 
a copy of a commission on record in his office to the Plaintiff. The question 
then becomes, did the Secretary have the statutory or constitutional authority 
to deny' plaintiff a copy of the corrnrission? Since the Congress had by statute 
required the Secretary to deliver a copy of all such| papers on record in his 
office to any member of the public upon payment of a required fee, the Court 
determined that he. did not have the delegated authority to refuse a copy. Thus, 
since the sovereign had left him no discretion in the matter, his refusal became 
a personal act against which relief could be granted. 
In Larson, the Administrator was "empowered by the sovereign to administer 
a-general sales program" and as a normal outgrowth d)f that power of agency, was 
authorized to refuse delivery when he determined that no delivery was called for 
under a contract of sale. Larson, supra, at 692. Therefore, the Administrator's 
refusal was well within the authority delegated to him by the sovereign. Upon 
invoking the second prong of our test, we find that there was no allegation that 
the delegation of authority was not constitutionally made, or that the authority 
was not constitutionally exercised. Td[ at 691. Thus, the Administrator's acts 
were the acts of the sovereign and the Administrator was absolutely iV-mune from 
suit. Alternatively, in Santa Clara, the Governor of the Pueblo exercised 
3 We are compelled to note at this point, that the Administrator was not immur 
only when his refusal to deliver was in fact a corrfect interpretation of the 
government's rights under the contract. Alleging & cause of action, and alleging 
an action without the sovereigns delegation of authority to the official are two 
separate and distinct propositions. "If the actions of an officer do not conflict 
with the terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are actions of the 
sovereign whether or not (they would give rise to a private cause of action)." 
Larson, supra, at 595. To hold otherwise would be to hold an officer immune only 
when he makes correct decisions and such is not thfe case. 
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as a member of the governing council of the Pueblo and therefore had no individual 
authorization by the sovereign to act in such matteris. 
The appropriate test, then, as to whether an agent of the government is 
immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, consists of a two-
pronged inquiry. In each case, the act complained of, whether ommission or 
commission, must be considered to determine (1) whether the action is within the 
statutorily or constitutionally delegated authority of that agent, and (2) if so, 
whether the authority to act was exercised in an constitutional manner. This Court 
for these purposes, finds it appropriate to adopt and a^ply the scope of authority 
exception to the sovereign immunity rule. 
Turning now to the facts before us, it is 'important*!© determine the 
characteristics and status of the various defendants prior to consideration of 
the complained of action. The ultimate sovereign is clearly the people of the 
lite Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. The constitution of the Tribe 
states in the preamble: 
We, the Ute Indians of the Uintah, Uncompahgfe and Whiteriver Bands 
hereafter to be known as the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation . . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation-
The Uintah and Ouray Tribal Business Committee is the aoverning body of the Ute 
Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (created by Article III of that 
Constitution, and is constitutionally vested with, among others, specific 
legislative, executive, administrative, and'ministerial powers of the Tribe. 
In other words, the Tribal Business Committee is the branch of the Tribal 
government to which the ultimate sovereign,.the Ute people, has delegated 
certain political, discretionary, and mandatory authority necessary for the day 
to day functions of the tribal government. Constitution Article VI. 
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duly elected from each of the three (3) bands of the Ute Indian Tribe of the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation, known as the Uintah, UncomDahgre and Whiter?ver 
Bands." Constitution Article III, Section 2. The Business Committee elects 
certain officers. . Constitution Article III, Section 4, and the By-Laws of the 
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation endow these officers with 
certain duties and authorities which are not critical here. By-Laws, Article I. 
It is sufficient here to note that the members and officers, as individuals, 
are nowhere granted any authority by the constitution to act in enrollment 
matters. 
The defendants then are analytically distinguishable agents of the ultimate 
sovereign created by the constitution. The critical question.is whether, in the 
instant case, these agents are exercising the authority of the sovereign., and if 
so, whether they are exercizing those powers in a method approved by that soverei 
The Uintah and Ouray Tribal Business Committee is not a body which has been 
delegated general authority by the sovereign. Contrarywise, it is a body with 
specific delegated authority which enumerates the subject matter within which 
that body is authorized to act on behalf of the sovereign, and places specific 
limitations upon that delegated authority. The act of the Tribal .Business 
CouHiittee herein complained of is the denial of plaintiff's enrollment applica-
tions, and the initial question then becomes whether, in these circumstances, 
the Tribal Business Committee has the authority to deny those applications. 
Since plaintiffs allege a vested constitutional right which the corrmittee allec 
does not have the authority to deny, the decision as to the immunity of the 
defendants becomes, in effect, a decision on the merits. See, Larson v. Domes' 
and Foreicn Commerce Corp., supra, at 690. 
Defendants primary contention is that Article II of the Ute Constitution 
created a closed class of persons who constituted the initial membership of t\ 
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to be made by "the Tribal Business Committee. Article II provides: 
Article II - Membership 
Section 1." The membership of the,Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation shall consist as follows: 
(a) All persons of Indian blood whose names appear on the 
official (sic) census roll of the Ute Indian Tribe of the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation as of July 1, 1935. 
(b) All children born to any member of the Ute Indian Tribe 
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation who is a resident of the 
Reservation at the time of the birth of said children. 
Section 2. The Tribal Business Corrmittee shall have the power to promul-
gate ordinances, subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior, 
covering future membership and the adoption of new members. 
.(a) No property rights shall .be acquired or lost through 
membership in this organization except as provided herein (sic). 
This contention is not persuasive. 
Article II of the Constitution clearly indicates at least two classes of 
persons who constitute the membership of.the Tribe. While we agree that the 
class defined in Article II, Section 1(a) constitutes a closed class of members • 
as of the date of enactment of the Constitution, Section 1(b) of Article II does 
not by its terms create a closed class. Section 1 of Article II does not state 
that it refers only to the initial membership, nor does it, on its face, place 
any limitation as to which children born to a member of the Tribe residing on 
the reservation are eligible for membership. Neither does Section 2 specifically 
place any such limitations on the persons recognized as eligible for membership 
in Section 1. -The Tribal Constitution is replete with examples which show that 
the framers thereof knew how to specifically limit certain provisions to initial 
application only. See for example, Article III, Section 3 (terms of members of 
the Business Committee); Article III, Section 5 (election of members of the 
Business Committee). They did not do so with Article II, Section 1(b). Since 
no limitation is specifically placed on the class..of persons defined .in Section 
1(b), "the question is whether the Business Committee has been granted the 
authority to place n m u a u u n b upuu mou .^^ ^^  „w „^ __ 
membership to a person who fits within the class. 
Defendants forcefully argue that Section 2 of Article II constitutes a 
general grant of legislative authority in membership matters of sufficient 
scope and breadth to allow the Business Committee tlo pass ordinances which 
effectively preclude the right to membership for sojme persons within the class 
defined in Article II, Section 1(b). In support ofl this argument, they cite 
a long history of Tribal Ordinances establishing certain blood quantum require-
ments as a prerequisite to enrollment. 
We recognize the venerable principle that great deference is to be given 
to legislative interpretations of Constitutional pd>wer and that when constitutiona 
language is ambigious, its effect may be established by usage. See, for example, 
Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517 (1940); Ex Parte Qui ran, '317 U.S. 1, 
41-42 (1942). However, even legislative, judicial and administrative interpreta-
tions of long standing cannot deprive a person of k vested and absolute constitu-
tional right. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Basic principles 
of constitutional and statutory construction indicate that every word and clause 
of the constitution is intended to be in effect unless the language of the 
constitution by its terms requires a different result; See Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed 60 (1803). 
Section 2 of Article II clearly places legislative authority in the Business 
Conraittee to promulgate ordinances covering future membership and the: adoption of 
new members. However, this delegation must be read with the companion delegation 
found in Article. YI, Section l(j). This article lists the deleaated powers of 
the Business Committee, and Section l(j) states: 
(j) To enact resolutions or ordinances, not Inconsistent with Article 11 
of this Constitution governing adoption and abandonment of members, and 
to keep at all times a correct roll of the members of the Ute Indian Tribe 
of the Uintah and Oura}' Reservation, (emphasfis by the Court). 
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Since the Constitution must be read as a whole in order to determine 11:> 
meaning, it is clear that the provisions of Article VI, Section l(j) must be 
read together with those of Article II, Section 2 in order to determine the 
extent of the power to legislate which the Constitution has delegated to the 
Tribal Business Committee. Phil brook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713, 44 L.Ed. 
2d. 525 (1975); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC,; 420 U.S. 395, 402-403, 
43 L.Ed. 2d. 279 (1975). The objective is to determine the intent of the 
framers of the Constitution and to give effect to their will. Id. 
The Court has searched in vain for some reasonable theory upon which 
defendants1 claims would be substantiated. If we assume for the purposes of 
argument that defendants, contentions.as.to the effect of Section 1 of Article 
II are true, then the membership of the'Tribe is defined as a closed class of 
persons identified in that section. There then exists no persons who can be 
said to be eligible for membership in the tribe in the absense of an ordinance 
or resolution of the Tribal Business Committee establishing the requirements for 
membership. Thus, under Defendants1 theory, new members may only be admitted to 
the Tribe by the process of adoption. 
The delegated powers of the Tribal Business Committee include the authority 
to govern the adoption of new members, but only insofar as that authority is 
exercised "not inconsistent with Article II" of the Constitution. The term 
"inconsistent" is generally defined to mean lacking in agreement in kind, nature 
or form, or not holding to the same principles or practice. Webster's New World 
Dictionary, Concise Edition (1955), Careful reading of Article II reveals that 
there are three substantial elements in that article: (1) a definition of the 
The term "adoption" as used to denote the process by which persons can 
be admitted to membership in the Tribe, is generally equivalent to the term 
"naturalization"--in-non-Indian-law-and practice.—That tenrris -not-used here 
to describe the process by which the parent-child relationship is created in 
domestic relations law. 
requirements for membersmp, UJ tne delegation on autnoriLy tu cue o u i m c ^ 
Committee to promulgate ordinances covering" Tuturel membership and the adoption' 
of new members, and (3) the requirement for Secretarial review. Clearly, in 
enacting legislation governing adoption, the only Ibasic elements with which 
such legislation could conflict would be either ellement (1) membership require-
ments, or element (3) the requirement for Secretarial review. We are unpersuaded 
that the limiting language of Article VI, Section |l(j) would have been included 
simply to provide for Secretarial review. The clelar majority of the subsections 
contained in Article VI, Section 1 call specificaljly for review by the Secretary 
of the Interior for action taken by the Business Gorrmittee. Clearly, this 
language could only, have been included with the inltent that the eligibility 
requirements contained in Article II should not be abridged.. Even under 
defendants1 theory of the case, the Business Commiiitee would not be authorized 
by the sovereign to enact and enforce legislation Iwhich prohibited a person .from 
becoming a member of the Tribe if such person meet the membership requirements 
contained in Article II. 
It is clear then that insofar as the blood quantum requirements established 
by the Tribal Business Committee are applied in sijch a way as to defeat the 
right to membership of a person who meets the requirements for membership 
established in Article II, such blood quantum requirements are aDplied without 
the authority of the sovereign and the persons applying such requirements are 
not entitled to the sovereigns immunity. In oth$r words, the sovereign has 
decreed in the constitution that those persons meeting the requirements of 
Article II, Section 1 are eligible for membership in the Tribe, the sovereign 
has not given any agent of. the Tribe the authority to remove cr defeat "that 
right, and therefore, any action by an agent.to defeat that right is not an 
act of the sovereign but an act of an individual vl/hich this court clearly has 
the power and duty to enjoin. 
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III. 
Defendants1 other assignment of error are without merit. Although 
defendant argues that the United States and the Secretary of the Interior 
are indispensible parties immune from the jurisdiction of this Court, the 
Secretary was not dismissed below. Furthermore, the Secretary^ presence is 
not necessary to determine the rights of the parties. Defendants1 contention 
that the 1954 Ute distribution act requires that only "full blood" Utes as 
defined in that act are now entitled to membership ifc negated by Section 677(d) 
as amended which finally states, "New membership in the tribes shall hereafter 
be controlled and determined by the constitution and by-laws of the tribe and 
ordinances enacted thereunder". Act of August 27, 1954, Ch 1009, & 5, 68 Stat 
868, Act of August 2, 1955, Ch 880, & 1, 70 Stat 93q. If the Congress had wished 
to limit the Tribe's constitutional definition of members when the right of 
enrollment and future membership was revitalize_d in 1956, it could have done 
expressly. 
Defendants1 final contention is that the jurisdiction of this Court to hear 
and determine these appeals have been withdrawn by virtue of Ordinance 78-8. 
Since we have today held that plaintiffs have a vesfted absolute constitutional 
right to enrollment which was in effect prior to the enactment of Ordinance 78-8, 
and since that ordinance was enacted after these adtions were filed, application 
of said ordinance to these actions would violate tfje provisions of the Ute Indian 
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation even if Ordinance 78-8 would have such 
an effect. 
IV. 
We must now consider Pla int i f fs cross appeals in Civil Numbers 133-77, 9-78, 
and 11-78 wherein Plaint i f fs appeal the failure ofi the Tribal Court to award 
attorneys fees to P la in t i f f s . P la in t i f fs c i te 42 IU.S.C-§-1938. as authority 
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for an award of attorneys fees. This section is inapplicable to actions in 
the Ute Tribal Court, and this Court adheres to th£ general rule that attorneys 
fees are not ordinarily awarded to the prevailing party from the losing party 
in the absence of contract or a specific statute authorizing such an award. 
No provision of the Ute Law and Order Code has beefi brought to our attention 
which would authorize an award of attorneys fees ifi this case and we decline 
to no so. 
AFFIRMED, IT IS SO ORDERED 
SEPARATE OPINION 
Chief Justice Pipestem concuring in part and dissebting in part. 
Pipestem, C.J. Although I concur in Parts I, III, and IV of the opinion of 
the majority, I wish to express my separate views regarding the Issue of sovereigi 
immunity. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.SL 49 (1978), clearly stands for 
the proposition that the Ute Tribe is immune from puit. Since the Tribal 
Business Committee clearly constitutes the legislative and executive body of 
the tribes it stands cloaked in the immunity of thie tribe insofar as it functions 
within its Constitutionally established duties. This is the precise body whose 
functions are entitled to and the beneficiary of t|he immunity described by the 
majority. 
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